The study extends the implications of Piketty's celebrated literature from developed countries to the nexus between developed nations and African countries by building on responses from 
Introduction
'Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer' (Lewis, 1955) . 'Lewis led all developing countries to water, proverbially speaking, some African countries have so far chosen not to drink' (Amavilah, 2014) . While Piketty's (2014) celebrated 'capital in the 21 st century' is consistent with Lewis, it has taken only developed countries to the stream. The present study aims to correct this shortcoming by extending the implications of Piketty's findings to African countries. In what follows, we articulate why it is important to extend Piketty's celebrated literature because the growing evidence of inequality as a challenge to 21 st century capitalism extends beyond the scope of developed countries (Brada & Bah, 2014) .
Irrational policies are increasingly driving exclusive development (Li et al., 2011, p. 109) due to 'immiserizing growth' 2 (Bhagwati, 1958) . According to some accounts (Asongu & De Moor, 2015) , the Top 1 percent have gained most (if not all) of the revenue accruing from the recent economic recovery (Covert, 2015) . Since income inequality has substantially increased over the past decade (Milanovic, 2011) , Oxfam (2015) sustains that the income of the Top 1% in the World could exceed that of the Bottom 99% by the year 2016. Consistent with Joseph Stiglitz: "There has been no improvement in well-being for the typical American family for 20 years. On the other side, the top one percent of the population gets 40 percent more in one week than the bottom fifth receive in a full year" (Nabi, 2013, p.10) . Therefore, there is an imperative "Need to design the right economic policies to enhance inclusiveness specially in the developing countries" (Nabi, 2013, p. 13) . Reducing exclusive development would require, inter alia, improving how finance drives growth (Freeman, 2010) . A position that is broadly shared by the World Hunger (2010) which has concluded that the principal cause of poverty and hunger in the globe today is a mainstream economic system that has encouraged the minority to grab most of the global wealth, such that the bottom billion are abandoned just to survive.
As far as we have reviewed, responses to the work of Piketty have included, among others, reviews and commentaries of diverse nature. These entail: cross-checking of facts (Branko, 2014 : Krusell & Smith, 2014 , data quality (Reynolds, 2014) , reviews (Homburg, 2014; Allen, 2014) , need for a more holistic approach to the global inequality problem (Rogoff, 2014a) and divers positions on real issues behind inequality (Stiglitz, 2014) . Among the above responses, those of Rogoff and Stiglitz are the closest to the present line of inquiry.
According to Rogoff (2014a) , Piketty's approach to the inequality problem should not have been limited to developed countries. The narrative sustains that it should also have incorporated developing (especially African) nations because the poor in developed countries may be considered super-rich in relative terms when perceived from less developed countries.
Moreover, the notion that inequality should be grounded exclusively on capitalism has some fundamental shortcomings when issues like colonialism, slavery, among others are considered. Accordingly, the externalities of colonialism have substantially contributed to global inequality (Frankema, 2006) . Stiglitz (2014) (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013) , convergence between the BM and WC as a new development paradigm (Asongu, 2014a) , greater need for self-reliance by African countries in charting their course to development (Fofack, 2014) , the false economic of preconditions (Monga, 2014) , development strategies based on a mixture successful development models with the WC (Fosu, 2013a) , the NSE (Lin & Monga, 2011; Norman & Stiglitz, 2012; Stiglitz et al., 2013ab; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013 ) that is advancing a synthesis between liberalism and structuralism, the LIP 3 based on quality & types of institutions in public service delivery (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrik, 2008; Brett, 2009; 2014, pp. 5-9) and the Moyo Conjecture which has been partially confirmed in Africa (Asongu, 2014b ) and a broad sample of developing counties (Lalountas et al., 2011) 4 .
As we shall substantiate in latter sections, it is important to articulate how post-WC models are linked to the extension of Piketty's findings to developing countries. For instance, while the Moyo conjecture emphasises that political rights should be prioritised because they 3 We discuss this school in substantive detail in Section 2. The interested reader can find more insights in Acemoglu et al. (2005) , Rodrik (2008) , Brett (2009) and Fofack (2014, pp. 5-9) . 4 There is growing stream of literature emphasising that political rights institutions are more endogenous to economic growth (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Asongu, 2014c mitigate inequality in the long-run (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a) , Stiglitz (2014) in responding to Piketty, has sustained that democracy is the principal cause of inequality in the 21 st century. A logical implication of this contradiction is that the issues at play may revolve beyond the underlying debates to more in-depth realities that limit both democracy and economic rights in developing countries, even in the presence of burgeoning economic growth.
In light of the above, less developed countries, the middle class and institutions are necessary to extend the implications of Piketty in the context of post-WC development models. Therefore, building on responses from Rogoff (2014a) and Stiglitz (2014) , we argue that the inequality problem between developed nations and African countries is at the centre of rational asymmetric development. Piketty has shown that inequality increases when the return of capital is higher than the growth rate. We argue that, when the return of political economy (or capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight) is higher than the growth rate in African countries, inequality in development increases. The intuition for the parallel analysis is fundamentally based on high levels of illicit capital flight from African countries far outweighing economic growth rates (OECD, 2014) 5 . Moreover, it is important to involve less developed countries into the inequality agenda because Piketty's literature has been celebrated on the prime factor that it has debunked the Kuznets' conjectures. But the conjectures of the latter were based on a comparison between developed and developing countries. Hence, the comparative scope of the present line of inquiry is granted and relevant to providing a more holistic perspective of Piketty's implications.
To the best of our knowledge, the study in the African development literature closest to the current line of inquiry is Fofack (2014, p. 13 ) which has reviewed different ideas 5 According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2014) , about 25% of African GDP is lost to corruption, of which a substantial portion is capital flight that is deposited in OECD tax havens. If the 25% is compared with the average growth rate of 5% in the continent, there is some rationale to infer that the rate of illicit capital fight might far outweigh the growth rate.
proposed for African development over the past decades and concluded on a development path based on self-reliance. This study consolidates the view of more self-reliance by extending the conclusions of Piketty's celebrated literature to African countries. Hence, the present paper steers clear of past models of African development. These include, among others: the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development (LPA, 1980 (LPA, -2000 ; the Africa's Priority for Economic Recovery (APPER, 1986 (APPER, -1990 ; the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990) ; the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP, 1989) and the 2001 New Partnership for African Development: NEPAD (OAU, 1980 (OAU, , 2001 Adedeji, 2002; Bujra, 2004) . In the first strand, there are two principal axes of post-WC models that have gained prominence after the 2008 financial crisis (Fofack, 2014, p. 9 (Fofack, 2014, p. 5-6; Lin, 2015) .
The NSE has been presented by Chang (2002) for the effective delivery of public commodities (Brett, 2009; Rodrik, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2005; North, 1990) . While Piketty's work is related to the above on the need to rethink the WC, the argument in the current paper is aligned with the need for a post-WC paradigm that integrates certain specificities of African development which directly draw on the implications of 'capital in the 21 st century'.
Moyo (2013) We devote some space to engaging how the attempt by the Moyo conjecture to reconcile the NSE and LIP has left room with which to motivate the positioning of this study:
rational asymmetric development and sprit of poverty in Africa. First, on the relationship with the LIP, the conjecture has complemented the paradigm by clearly articulating an institutional design of development. In line with the narrative, the transition from low-income to higherincome should be accompanied with a trading-off of 'economic rights priorities' for 'political rights priorities'. Second, the NSE paradigm is complemented by laying down some foundation for a unified economic theory that accounts for both market and State failures. In essence, whereas the proposed BM as short-run development preference favours prudence in economic openness and State regulation, the WC (or long-term) alternative is opposed to the stated preferences.
A substantial challenge to the NSE paradigm (see Acemoglu et al., 2005, p. 387 ) is the absence of some kind of causal nexus between economic growth and a specific institutional design. Asongu (2014a) sustains that the conjecture has tackled the issue by establishing that economic (political) institutions should be the priority at the early (latter) stages of industrialisation. The contribution has steered clear of the fundamental 'one-size fits all' framework which does not incorporate the structural and institutional challenges at various stages of the development process. In the same vein, while political rights should be prioritised because they mitigate inequality in the long-run (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a) , Stiglitz (2014) in responding to Piketty, has sustained that democracy is the principal cause of inequality in the 21 st century. A logical implication of this contradiction is that the issues at play may revolve beyond the underlying debates to more in-depth realities that limit both democracy and economic rights in developing countries, notwithstanding burgeoning economic growth.
In Africa for instance, where poverty has been substantially documented to be associated with considerable huge volumes of illicit capital flight (Fofack & Ndikumana, 2010 Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008 Asongu, 2014d) 
Kuznets and developing countries have motivated responses to Piketty
'Capital in the 21 st century' has featured prominently in most scholarly debates in recent months because it has debunked the previously widely celebrated Kuznets' (1955 Kuznets' ( , 1971 ) conjecture on an inverted U-shape relationship between inequality and industrialisation.
For brevity and lack of space, we resist the itch of discussing the widely known Kuznets' The former is engaged in Section 4 while the latter is consistent with the second question of Section 3 highlighted above, which we address immediately.
On the second issue, developing countries also matter as much as developed nations in the celebration of Piketty because inequality also matters more than growth in the fight against poverty in less developed countries. This statement is accurate because the narratives of Piketty on developed countries are consistent with a growing stream of the literature on developing nations emphasising the needs to articulate inequality in the poverty-growth nexus (see Fosu, 2015; Thorbecke, 2013; Kalwij & Verschoor, 2007) . The currents include, among others: the critical role of inequality in the alleviation of poverty (Ali & Thorbecke, 2000; Datt & Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 1993) ; the essence of income-inequality in the growth elasticities of poverty (Ravallion, 1997; Easterly, 2000; Fosu, 2015) and policy making (Adam, 2004) . Therefore, the coverage of more developed nations by Piketty is consistent with evolving currents from African countries (Fosu, 2008 (Fosu, , 2009 (Fosu, , 2010a (Fosu, , 2010b and broader samples of developing nations (Fosu, 2010c) .
Given that clarifying the second question of this section is crucial for the present study, we devote another paragraph to engaging the underlying literature analytically. It can be summarised in the following: as much as in developed countries, in developing nations inequality also matters more than growth in poverty mitigation because a recent stream of empirical literature has established that the response of poverty to growth is a decreasing function of inequality, since the inequality elasticity of poverty is higher than the growth elasticity of poverty. In essence: "The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality" (Fosu, 2010b, p. 818) ; "The responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty" (Fosu, 2010c (Fosu, , p. 1432 ; and "In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth" (Fosu, 2011, p. 11) .
In light of the above, the Fosu conclusions on developing countries converge with Piketty's celebrated literature and Lewis' caution: 'Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer' (Lewis, 1955) . These intersections of Piketty, Lewis and Fosu are consistent with a growing stream of literature on post-2015 sustainable development goals (Ozgur et al., 2009; Timmons et al., 2009; Monika & Bobbin, 2012; Bagnara, 2012; Singh, 2014; Miller, 2014) . Therefore, in charting the pattern towards greater industrialisation, there is an urgent policy syndrome in developed as well as in developing nations of accounting for inequality in the growth effect of poverty (Asongu, 2015a) . Within the context of the present study, it entails incorporating some capitalism motivated rationales for asymmetric development that may dampen the effects of growth on poverty
Underpinnings for 'rational asymmetric development' and 'spirit of poverty'
In this section, we elucidate (i) the concept of rational asymmetric development employed in the study; (ii) engage the rationale of asymmetric development in capitalismfuelled illicit capital flight on the one hand and on the other hand, (iii) the implications of capital flight in increasing poverty, with particular emphasis on case studies from resourcerich and high-growth African countries. But as highlighted in Section 3, it is also fundamental to understand the ambiguous role of capitalism as an instrument by developed nations for lifting less developed countries out of poverty. Hence, a fourth strand in the section is devoted to (iv) briefly discussing the ambiguity of foreign aid when illicit capital flight outweighs economic growth.
The first strand provides some framework for the conception of 'rational asymmetric development' used in this study. Within the context of the paper, it refers to unfair practices of globalisation adopted by advanced nations to the detriment and impoverishment of less developed countries. The interested reader can find more insights into capitalism-driving rational asymmetry in 'Making Globalization Work' (Stiglitz, 2007) In the second strand, the rationale for asymmetric development in capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight is driven substantially by a plethora of factors, among others: tax evasion by multinationals and investment of siphoned funds by African public officials in markets with security and high turnover. (i) Multinational corporations in Africa have been using questionable accounting practices to declare low profits and hence pay less tax to domestic governments. This engenders negative implications for economic sustainability in domestic economies (Osabuohien et al., 2013 (Osabuohien et al., , 2014 (Osabuohien et al., , 2015 . ( sustained that the regressive effect of illicit capital flight is further strengthened by financial imbalances which culminate in devaluations that have a less negative effect on the wealthy because they often possess foreign assets that insulate them from the unappealing effects.
We now discuss some country-specific cases in which economic growth has been accompanied with substantial capital flight, hence, leading to low levels of wellbeing and lack of basic needs. In line with Ndikumana & Boyce (2012) It is also important to devote space for an in-depth analysis of how capital flight has deteriorated the quality of growth in the three countries. The Quality of Growth rankings recently published by the IMF shows deterioration in the positions of the underlying countries between 1990 and 2011 (Mlachila et al., 2014, p.27) . From a comparative assessment of 93 developing nations in the periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 & 2005-2011 In the fourth strand, we briefly discuss the ambiguity of foreign aid in poverty mitigating in situations where capital flight is higher than economic growth. Though the stated purpose of this study is not to discuss the issue of foreign aid, unfortunately we cannot resist the itch of engaging the political economy of development assistance because foreign aid is a substantial dichotomy of illicit capital flight. Accordingly, there is mainstream consensus that capital flight is about tenfold the annual development assistance flows and twofold the amount of debt repaid by developing economies annually (Diak, 2014) . A recent theoretical postulation that capitalism-driven debts fuel inequality (Azzimonti et al., 2014) has been verified and confirmed in Africa . The fact that Africa is a net creditor to the rest of the world is now a widely accepted economic fact in academic and policy circles (Asongu, 2014d) . In what follows, we briefly discuss the paradox of capital flight in a capital-starved African continent before extending the implications of Piketty to Africa in light of the literature we have analytically engaged this far. Source: Asiedu et al. (2012) Consistent with Asiedu et al. (2012) , reliance on external financing to address the investment needs in order to fight poverty in Africa is problematic for at least three reasons.
First, foreign aid and FDI are volatile and volatility has adverse consequences on economies (see Kangoye, 2013) . Second, an extensive literature on growth shows that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is ambiguous, with provocative titles like 'foreign aid follies' (Rogoff, 2014b) , sceptical conclusions from surveys, documenting literature on more than 40 years of foreign aid (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2008 or the debates (Asongu, 2014e) and clarifications (Asongu, 2015b) on the questionable economics of foreign aid for inclusive human development in Africa. Third, the region has made very unsuccessful attempts at attracting FDI. There is an interesting stream of FDI (Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Anyanwu, 2012) and African business (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Asongu, 2013a) literature supporting this position.
The narrative concludes that given previous unsuccessful attempts at attracting external flows, the trend is not very likely to change. Hence, it is unrealistic to substantially rely on external finance for investment needs in the short-& medium-terms. In proposing a solution, the authors have recommended that sub-Saharan African nations establish effective strategies toward mitigating illicit capital flight within the framework of a broader agenda of resource mobilization for economic development. Extending the implications of Piketty with
Solow-Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana is a step towards consolidating this recommendation.
Extending Piketty with Solow-Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana
It is interesting to first of all clarify the context of Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana and Solow-Swan before discussing how the underpinnings are relevant in extending the implications of Piketty.
First, the concept of catch-up or convergence motivated by Solow-Swan (1956) builds from an assumption of diminishing returns, such that less developed countries are endowed with a higher marginal capital productivity. In this light, due to similar levels of savings, poor economies as expected to grow faster relative to their developed counterparts. Hence, a negative correlation is expected between initial income levels and future growth rates.
Therefore, the extension of Piketty in this study is typically consistent with the theoretical underpinnings employed in cross-country income convergence literature (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992 , 1995 Mankiw et al., 1992; Fung, 2009 ) which have been recently extended to other fields of development, notably:
financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012) , intellectual property rights (Asongu, 2013b; Andrés & Asongu, 2013) , forecasting of political crisis (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2014) , knowledge economy (Asongu, 2013c) and inclusive human development (Asongu, 2014f) . In this light, extending Piketty's work is within this recent stream of literature employing the theoretical underpinnings of Solow-Swan within broader development frameworks.
The use of Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana is to emphasis studies which to the best of our knowledge have substantially enriched the literature on African capital flight. Hence, it is neither meant to underestimate contributions from other authors in this research area nor to consider works of underlying authors as supreme relative to those of their peers in the field.
Therefore, the acronym is as far as we have reviewed, limited to our knowledge at the time of this study.
The extension of Piketty is a three-step analogy: conclusion, implication and recommendation. Piketty has concluded that (i) when the return to capital is higher than the growth rate, inequality increases. Hence, (ii) the poor cannot catch-up with the rich. He has proposed an ideal solution (iii) of progressive income taxation (targeting the return on capital)
that is based on automatic exchange of bank information. As an extension, (i) we postulate that when the return to political economy (or capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight) is higher than the growth rate, there is asymmetric development between rich and poor countries. 
Implications for the upward bias in endogenous development and catch-up
Contrary to some evidence documenting catch-up by African countries with direct assessment of questions like 'Is Africa Actually Developing? ' (Alan & Carlyn, 2015, p. 598) , there are strong arguments with which to suggest the contrary. While the underlying literature sustains that Africa is catching-up because it is experiencing a higher growth rate relative to developed countries or declining poverty relative to other regions of the world (Fosu, 2015) 6 , this catch-up may not be so apparent when a fraction of GDP lost to illicit capital flight is factored-in. A natural criticism that may arise could be whether the corresponding illicit capital flight is deducted from GDP ex-ante or ex-post of per capita GDP convergence estimations. Accordingly, corruption from African elites has been documented to substantially derive from the inflation of consumption and investment components of GDP (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003 It is logical to infer that a substantial amount of siphoned funds is considered ex-ante of GDP per capita computations and hence, illicit capital flight is part of reported GDP. A natural logic that follows is that if illicit capital flows from an economy is higher than the growth rate of the underlying economy, catch-up with developed countries would remain very elusive. This inference is based on the assumption that illicit capital flows are hidden in tax havens based in developed countries. We have already alluded to why illicit capital flight is:
(i) higher than economic growth and (ii) deposited for the most part in developed nations, in the introduction. Moreover, there is a substantial body of literature confirming that a great portion of illicit capital flows are deposited in OECD countries (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003) .
As an implication, there may be an upward or positive bias in the endogenous GDP of African nations used in the convergence literature. This may partly explain why Africa's growth miracle has been underestimated by about 400% (Young, 2012) and goes a long way to casting some shadow on recent findings establishing that Africa is on time for certain millennium development poverty targets (Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014) .
In order to understand the wider implications of the above in the catch-up literature, it is important to examine the results beyond the light of widely documented per capita income convergence and engage how the inferences reflect the scarce human development catch-up literature. Consistent with Asongu (2014f) , by 2008, Konya & Guisan (2008, p. 9) acknowledged that only three studies had examined catch-up in living standards, notably:
Mazumdar ( Sutcliffe (2004) has also rebuffed the idea of HDI convergence in 99 countries using a more updated sample . According to Sutcliffe, the idea of HDI convergence may be a hidden agenda of some multilateral organisations like the IMF to reduce the acknowledged setbacks of the long-run world economic history. In the same vein, the idea of catch-up between Africa and the West, given appalling rates of African capital flight may be partly explained by the elucidations of Sutcliffe. The findings of Noorbakhsh (2006) have been subject to many criticisms (Konya & Guisan, 2008, pp. 28-29) .
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Conclusion
This study has assessed the inequality problem in light of policy implications from 
